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In extraordinary situations, certain individuals may require access 
to information for which they are not normally authorized. For 
example, to facilitate rescue of people trapped inside of a burning 
building, firefighters may need its detailed floor plan -- 
information that may not typically be accessible to emergency 
responders. Thus, it is necessary to provide transient trust so that 
such sensitive information is available to selected individuals only 
during the emergency. The architecture presented here is designed 
to support transient trust. It encompasses pre-positioned, 
updateable domains for use exclusively during emergencies along 
with a set of “normal” domains with different sensitivity levels. 
Allocated to partitions, these domains are entered via a high 
integrity trusted path service located in a separate trusted partition. 
Interaction among subjects in different partitions is controlled by 
a high assurance separation kernel, and efficient use of devices is 
achieved through the application of a three-part device model. The 
resulting architecture enforces mandatory security policies, yet 
ensures secure and revocable access to a class of information 
during declared emergencies. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.2.11 [Software Engineering]: Software Architectures, D.4.6 




Virtualization, Multilevel Security, Emergency Management, 
Separation Kernel 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A common paradigm of secure computing is the tradeoff between 
usability and security.  While timely access to accurate 
information can be a significant competitive differentiator for 
nations as well as enterprises, the ability to protect that 
information can be just as significant.  Frustration with the 
inability to access information in recent armed conflicts and civil 
catastrophes clarified for many decision-makers that the balance 
between information availability and protection is a risk 
management action that should not be constrained by a rigid 
security policy.  Rather, it has become clear to many that the 
mechanisms for controlling and accessing information must 
incorporate multiple situational factors to ensure the risk/benefit 
tradeoff is correctly calculated, and that the decisions must be 
automated to ensure timely access. [29][40] 
We present a security architecture for supporting emergency 
access to information that incorporates and extends current 
separation kernel technology to provide high assurance of the 
confinement and revocation of sensitive information accessed 
during an emergency, such that the risk of allowing extraordinary 
access is mitigated. To achieve this assurance we confine 
emergency information temporally – it can only be accessed 
extraordinarily during a discrete emergency – and spatially – it is 
not allowed to leave a special “emergency partition” that is 
protected by a highly robust separation kernel.[28] 
The target platform for research and validation of our approach is 
a handheld computer, the E-device. Our security solutions in this 
form factor provide a mobile emergency-response capability that 
enables rapid, knowledgeable actions; promotes usability; and 
ensures sensitive emergency-support information is protected as it 
is communicated, processed and stored. The result is a trusted 
foundation for effective crisis management activities.  
To describe our architecture, we first highlight its major 
contributions and provide background on access control, risk 
management and the tension between the need for information 
protection and flexibility. A brief description of emergency 
operations sets the stage for a presentation of the architecture, 
which describes its protection domains and the allocation of 
functionality and policies to those domains.  Our analysis includes 
user interaction, transient trust, the use of hardware, and our 
prototype. A comparison with related work is followed by a 
summary of this paper.  
2. CONTRIBUTIONS 
We describe a coherent security architecture, based on a 
separation kernel, that features several innovations:  
• A special isolated environment for extraordinary access to 
sensitive information.  This “emergency partition” features 
high assurance of data confinement and revocation, as well 
as the ability for the user to process data with commercial 
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emergency partition to users except during discrete 
“emergency” periods, after which information updates can be 
relayed to a central authority and the entire partition can be 
automatically purged.   
• A dedicated environment for high integrity processing.  
Using a trusted path, the user accesses a trusted partition in 
which simple high assurance applications provide services 
such as trusted signing and communication. 
• Interaction between partitions, whether through 
communication devices or other objects, is controlled 
completely by the separation kernel, with kernel assurance.  
This is a fundamentally different approach from other recent 
separation kernel security architectures.[22]  
• An efficient device model in which the kernel ensures the 
separation of activities through the virtualization of shared 
devices, without depending on trusted subject programs.  In 
general, access to a device does not require a context switch 
to another partition.  Also, any physical device that is 
dedicated to a given partition (viz., not shared) can be passed 
through to the external domain for direct access by the client 
OS. 
3. BACKGROUND 
There are many approaches for controlled sharing of information; 
however, when the effects of information compromise are high – 
e.g., loss of life or limb, or other serious damage to an individual, 
enterprise or nation – policies and mechanisms that can ensure 
global and persistent protection of the information are required. 
Research has shown that policies for this sort of protection are 
representative of a label-based lattice abstraction [8], in which 
information flow or access control is maintained via labels applied 
to active subjects and passive objects. A supporting policy [9] 
generally requires that subjects’ labels should not be of more 
sensitivity than the related user’s clearance.  Coupled with an 
automated security policy that prohibits a subject from observing 
information of greater sensitivity, [6] the supporting policy 
ensures that users cannot read “up.” Complementary rules [6] 
prevent accidental or malicious “write down” by automated 
subjects. This describes the traditional “rigid” security policy 
mentioned in the introduction.  It should be noted that government 
operational practices supporting this policy do not generally allow 
clearances to be raised without a corresponding, and very 
expensive, background check.  Similarly, to support global and 
persistent policy enforcement, object labels are not allowed to 
change; however, through the use of special high assurance 
mechanisms and human review, trusted components may move 
information from high objects to low ones. 
On the other hand, a risk-management approach to security might 
conclude that the benefit of providing a person with information 
for which he has not been vetted outweighs the risk (e.g., to the 
information owner) of exposure of that information. In 
emergencies, it is desirable that such a decision be made 
automatically, rather than waiting for human review.  In a grossly 
simplified example, a decision engine could be calibrated to allow 
extraordinary access to a datum if the information availability 
would save lives, even though the information exposure would put 
at risk a certain amount of property. (Policies and mechanisms for 
providing these calibrations are outside of the scope of this paper). 
However, this risk-management approach is problematic, since it 
is not likely in a traditional multi-level secure (MLS) policy 
enforcement environment that the required emergency access 
could be accomplished by simply declassifying information or 
raising user clearances, without appropriate and time consuming 
procedures.  For example, consider when classified information is 
found to have leaked into a traditional unclassified environment 
(e.g., see [27][37][38]): the environment must be 
“decontaminated” by a highly skilled technical team. Such a team 
may expand the investigation to include all connected 
environments to which the information could have transitively 
leaked and all persons who may have viewed the information in 
any of the environments. Computers and communications systems 
are immediately isolated and then purged of the information, such 
that any permissions to or copies of the information are revoked.  
The users are “debriefed” to retrieve any hard copies of the 
information they may have made, to ensure they agree to keep the 
knowledge secure, and to understand the residual risk of users’ 
knowledge.  If decontamination is successful, the environment 
may be allowed to go back “on line;” otherwise the equipment 
may be confined to the classified environment, or destroyed.   
In the next sections we describe how extraordinary access to 
information can be provided to selected users, and afterward can 
be automatically and completely revoked without the need to treat 
the user’s environment as having been contaminated.
1
 First, we 
review our concepts for management of information in an 
emergency. 
4. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS 
The basic assumption is that many emergencies could be handled 
more effectively if vital, sensitive information (e.g., detailed 
schematics of a large building or transit system) could be 
communicated in a timely and secure manner to first 
responders.[12] Emergencies involve various government and 
non-government responding organizations, with one organization 
acting as a coordinating authority (e.g., the Department of 
Homeland Security). Other organizations represent the employers 
of first responders, or are Third Party providers of information 
that may be required during an emergency. The Authority 
establishes operating agreements or memoranda of understanding 
(MOUs) with the other organizations in advance of an emergency, 
which define the authority, responsibilities and operating 
parameters for the emergency response network.   
The field device for first responders is a handheld that is suitable 
for normal day-to-day data processing and communication as well 
as emergency response usage (hereafter referred to as an E-
Device). The E-device is designed for use by a single user at a 
time, much like a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA). The E-device 
supports different security contexts for different roles, as well as 
an emergency context (discussed below). Whether the E-device is 
to be passed among multiple users is a matter of policy.  The E-
device can be configured so that selected partitions would be 
available only to certain individuals. 
During setup of the emergency network and the E-devices, 
emergency-related information and cryptographic keys are 
installed on the devices.  Emergency-specific data can also be sent 
from the authority or third parties to the E-Device when it is in the 
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 It is understood in this work that modifications to law, MLS rules and 
MLS policy enforcement infrastructures may be required to support an 
emergency access, or “need to share” paradigm that allows special 
access to information in extraordinary circumstances.[4][29] 
field, either during the emergency or to update emergency-related 
information during normal periods.  
5. ARCHITECTURE 
The Transient Trust architecture encompasses the Least Privilege 
Separation Kernel (LPSK) running on x86 hardware (with 
enhancements in certain configurations [19]), the Trusted Security 
Services Layer (TSL), the Trusted Executive (TE), and the 
Trusted Path Application (TPA; see Figure 1).  
The TE provides minimal high-level operating system-like 
services to the applications that depend on it.  The TPA provides a 
trustworthy interface between the user and the other trusted 
components of the E-Device. Table 1 summarizes the functions 
allocated to the system layers, each of which is discussed in the 
sections that follow.  
5.1 LPSK 
The LPSK is designed to meet the security requirements of the 
NSA-validated separation kernel protection profile (SKPP).[28] 
The LPSK virtualizes and allocates shared resources, such that 
each partition encompasses a resource set that appears to be 
entirely its own. For physical resources that can only be accessed 
by one process at a time (e.g., the CPU), the LPSK virtualizes the 
resource such that the temporal usage patterns of subjects in 
different partitions are not apparent to each other. For resources 
such as memory that can be accessed by different processes 
“simultaneously” (i.e., with respect to a virtualized CPU, or 
assuming multiple execution cores) the separation kernel may 
allocate to processes different and non-interacting portions of the 
resource to ensure separation.  Furthermore, kernel utilization of 
its own internal resources must also preserve the desired 
separation properties.  
The LPSK manages all hardware resources; it reserves some 
resources for itself; and it exports various resource abstractions at 
its interface, such as processes, memory objects, devices, etc.  The 
LPSK separates all of the resources it exports into distinct 
“partitions”, and enforces a native policy of separation of 
partitions, with explicitly allowed exceptions (viz. inter-partition 
flows) that are defined in the LPSK configuration data. As 
required by the SKPP, these flows form a partial ordering.[28] In 
addition, the LPSK implements the optional least privilege policy 
requirements of the SKPP, in which it controls access by subjects 
to individual resources. Hardware task management and other 
mechanisms are used to maintain isolation between partitions as 
well as between processes.[20]  Threads within a process, if used 
at the application layer, e.g., by a client OS to create its own 
processes, are not distinguished with respect to the information 
flow policy. Eventcount and sequencer objects [33] are exported 
for inter-process synchronization. As permitted by policy, 
memory and network resources may be shared by partitions and 
may be used for inter-partition communication. 
If there is more than one process in a partition, they execute 
according to any of a variety of scheduling protocols that may be 
defined in the LPSK configuration data until the partition’s time 
slice is finished. As defined in the LPSK configuration data, 
execution changes between partitions are based on a fixed 
schedule, or lattice-scheduling algorithm similar to that described 
by Hu [13], to prevent covert timing channels. 
A set of minimized device services are provided by the LPSK. 
This includes detection of the Secure Attention Key (SAK), which 
is managed by the TSL  (See Section 5.4). 
The LPSK accepts configuration data as input during 
initialization.  The configuration data defines the creation and 
assignment of resources to partitions, data flow rules, partition 
schedule parameters, memory allocation of segments, etc. The 
configuration data also defines process initialization information 
such as per-process handles for individual memory objects,  
devices, as well as addressing information for raw disks (from 
which, for example,  a client OS can create its own disk objects). 
5.2 Trusted Security Services Layer 
The Trusted Security Services Layer (TSL) virtualizes certain 
resources exported by the LPSK (e.g., networking devices, I/O 
devices and disk, as discussed in Section 5.4) and exports 
dynamic abstractions of static LPSK resources that a typical client 
 
Figure 1. Transient Trust Architecture. Partition sensitivity labels have the format: 
[SECRECY:INTEGRITY]. 
OS would expect to control (such as the creation of memory 
objects). The TSL API also includes a virtualized BIOS interface 
to emulate the native (raw hardware) environment expected by 
client OSes. 
The TSL associates a human-readable sensitivity label with each 
partition, such that all resources in a partition have the same 
(implicit) label.  Labels are assigned in concert with the partial 
ordering enforced by the LPSK, which can be configured to 
present a multilevel security policy at the TSL interface, if 
desired. This combination of the LPSK, providing strong 
isolation, with the TSL, providing policy-specific semantics, 
supports the development of “policy aware” [17] and trusted 
applications in the layers supported by the TSL. 
Table 1  Layering Summary 
Layer Functions and Policies 
TPA Trusted Path interface to security-critical services 
TE Application Management 
User Management 
Operating System Services 




Trusted Channel Management 
Internet routing and Inter-Partition Networking 
Emergency Management 
LPSK Partitioning of Resources 
Resource Management 
Mandatory Access Control Policy Enforcement 
Process/Partition Scheduling 
Cross-Partition and Inter-Process Communication 
Secure Attention Key (SAK) Detection 
 
5.3 Partitions 
The LPSK exports three types of partition: normal, trusted, and 
emergency. For simplicity, only a small number of normal and 
emergency partitions are described here, but many normal 
partitions (e.g., several per human-readable label) and emergency 
partitions can be configured. For example, there could be separate 
emergency partitions for each type of emergency: flood, fire, 
windstorm, pandemic, asteroid impact, volcano, etc. Emergency 
partition granularity would be specific to the first-responder 
organization.  
Each normal partition is assigned a specific sensitivity level and is 
intended to support the user’s regular data processing activities in 
a manner similar to a commercial handheld or PDA, with a simple  
client OS that hosts off-the-shelf applications.    For example, 
there may be a normal partition for corporate-internal work, 
another for collaboration with a business partner, and one for 
personal use.  
The trusted partition hosts a trusted path application (TPA) and 
other high integrity applications that require a high assurance 
execution environment, provided by the Trusted Executive. The 
TPA supports device login, partition selection, and selection of 
high integrity security services. The secure attention key allows 
users to invoke the Trusted Path Application without being 
spoofed by malicious applications. The LPSK services the SAK 
interrupt and passes control to the TSL, which invokes the TPA.  
The TPA is configurable to support single sign on, or a per-
partition identification and authentication dialog. Of course, most 
policies would require robust identification and authentication for 
access to sensitive partitions. 
The emergency partition holds data that the user is not authorized 
to see under normal conditions and which the LPSK prohibits 
from leaving the partition.  In the event of an emergency, the 
central authority would signal the E-device (e.g., wirelessly) that 
an emergency has been declared, which would then (and only 
then) enable the user to “enter” the emergency partition. At this 
point, access to emergency information would require user 
identification and authentication and possibly session level 
negotiation. When the emergency is over, the central authority 
would signal the E-Device that the emergency has ended, which 
would once again disable access to the emergency partition, and 
hibernate all processes in that partition. 
During the transition back to normal operations, emergency 
information created or collected in the field may be transmitted 
back to the central authority. To purge the emergency partition of 
information associated with a particular incident, and return the 
OS and applications to their initial state, the active emergency 
partition can be overwritten by the contents of the passive (i.e., 
non-executing and “read-only”) emergency partition (see Figure 
1) which contains a baseline image of the emergency partition. 
The TSL is responsible for re-initializing the emergency partition.  
There are certainly scenarios for which the E-device would 
require additional protections.  For example, if it were to be used 
in combat, then the architecture would be required to include 
mechanisms that would prevent compromise of emergency 
information should the E-device fall into the hands of an 
adversary.   
5.4 Devices and Communications 
The LPSK provides both synchronous and asynchronous 
device I/O interfaces and services. To meet high assurance 
requirements, the device management offered by the LPSK is 
simple and minimal. In our design, it is not necessary to incur the 
expense of a full context switch when a partition accesses a 
device, a possible bottleneck and performance challenge in other 
architectures [31]. 
Device management is characterized in three ways in our 
architecture.  First, certain devices may be virtualized by the 
combined LPSK and TSL. In this case, as permitted by the 
configuration, the client operating systems and trusted executive 
may simultaneously share the services of the underlying device.  
Second, a device may be assigned solely to a particular partition. 
For example, memory-mapped devices may be used so that they 
interact with processes through dedicated memory regions. Here 
device management is vectored by the LPSK to a client OS for its 
exclusive use. 
Finally, the TSL supports focus management by assigning 
exclusive use of user I/O devices (viz., the keyboard, mouse, and 
screen) to a designated partition until the user, via the TPA, 
chooses to associate the devices with a different partition. While 
user input is vectored to the selected partition, other partitions can 
continue to update their screen buffers. Additionally, the system 
supports configurations with tiled windowing, so that output from 
partitions with sensitivity levels dominated by the user’s current 
session level can be simultaneously displayed.  The TSL will save 
other partition screen output until the user establishes a session at 
a high enough level. Thus, instead of having to shut down activity 
at a particular session level to make the device available at a 
different level, e.g. [24][25], all partitions can continue to execute 
according to the predefined CPU-sharing schedule.  
Each exported device has two labels associated with it: a read-
class and a write class. [23]   A device where both labels are equal 
is a single-level device; a device for which the two labels are 
different is a multilevel device.  
For serial-use multilevel devices, the TSL exports an interface for 
administrators to change of the “current level” of the device 
during runtime, thereafter restricting access to the device to that 
security level. A concurrent-use multilevel device can be used by 
several single-level partitions at the same time.  The device 
appears to (the processes in) each partition as a single level 
device, as: (1) subjects in a given partition can only read data 
from the device that is labeled at or below the level of that 
partition; and (2) data written to the device by those subjects is 
labeled by the TSL  at the level of their partition.  
Finally, a multilevel device can be used by a trusted application, 
which is trusted to apply the right labels to its data.   
The TSL manages network devices to establish trusted 
communication channels between the E-Device and the central 
authority or trusted third parties.  The TSL receives emergency 
“begin” and “end” signals from the central authority on a trusted 
channel, verifies the signal and, restricts or allows access to the 
emergency partition accordingly.  It may also raise or lower 
alarms to other programs within the E-Device, as configured to do 
so. In this way, the device model is essential to achieving the 
overall transient trust capability of the architecture. 
Partitions may host network-capable client operating systems. The 
TSL network devices can be used for communications between 
partitions and to external nodes while ensuring enforcement of the 
system’s information flow policy. For example, since network 
communication protocols are two-way, in a partition-to-partition 
communication channel, both partitions must be the same 
sensitivity level. 
5.5 Support for Client Operating Systems 
In normal and emergency partitions, the E-Device hosts a client 
operating system that allows the user to use common applications 
and file types (e.g., for graphics display and word processing).  
The trusted partition hosts a very simple Trusted Executive (TE) 
for the purpose of running high assurance, high integrity, custom 
applications. We anticipate that trusted applications will be very 
compact and present a character-based interface, as the evaluation 
of graphics-based applications is costly. The Trusted Executive 
provides a necessary and sufficient set of services to support the 
Trusted Path Application and possible other trusted applications. 
These include application management, user management such as 
identification and authentication support, and a small set of 
common operating system services.  
5.6 Trusted Applications 
As discussed, the Trusted Path Application (TPA) presents the 
user with an interface for high assurance identification and 
authentication, invocation of trusted applications, emergency 
notification, and logout, as well as partition selection. Because of 
the criticality of the trusted path to the correct operation of the E-
device, we allocate it to a separate privilege level than that 
occupied by other trusted applications.  
While the E-device evaluation and certification will include the 
LPSK TSL, TE and TPA, additional trusted applications can be 
installed by system integrators and other customers to provide 
customized high integrity services. The layered hardware 
separation provided by the privilege level mechanism ensures that 
any additional trusted applications will not affect the 
trustworthiness of the E-device’s evaluated base. 
6. DISCUSSION 
6.1 Security Policy and User Session Level 
To ensure effective enforcement of the security policy, the 
interpretation of security labels must be consistent across all E-
devices in a given emergency response network. While each 
partition of each E-device may be assigned a different sensitivity 
level, multiple partitions may have the same label, forming an 
equivalence class of partitions with respect to the security policy, 
which extends to all E-devices and other trusted computers in the 
emergency network.  
A user request to change partitions results in a “session level 
negotiation” based on various user and partition attributes (e.g., 
sensitivity level, temporal restrictions, and roles) and the 
emergency response network security policy.  In a typical E-
device configuration, changing partitions effectively alters the 
user’s session level, within the constraints of the user’s clearance. 
The LPSK’s information flow policy  can be configured to allow 
inter-partition information sharing. Thus, during an emergency the 
user might be able to read information from normal (non-
emergency) partitions, or, for example, the user at a 
SECRET:LOW session level could read information from a 
partition that is at the UNCLASS:LOW level. 
6.2 Transient Trust Assurance 
Access to all information is enforced globally across the 
emergency response network and persistently during data 
transport, processing and storage.  Emergency information is 
isolated both temporally and spatially.  Emergency information is 
only stored in the emergency partition, where it is confined. 
Communication between the emergency partition and a remote 
entity with the same label (e.g., the authority) is allowed, as such 
an entity is in the same policy equivalence class as the emergency 
partition. Users are only able to enter the emergency partition 
during an emergency, and only following appropriate 
identification and authentication via the TPA. After the 
emergency, emergency partition processes are hibernated (except 
when activated to receive updated information), and any data 
created or collected in the emergency partition can be uploaded to 
the central authority, and purged from the E-device. 
One might posit the application of the architecture presented here 
for use in embedded devices.  Without a requirement for a user 
interface, the TPA would be unnecessary; however, since 
organizational policies regarding the handling of emergency 
indicators are likely to differ, the TE and a trusted handler, though 
simpler than the TPA, would still be needed to manage transient 
trust with high integrity. 
6.3 Hardware-Supported Privilege Domains  
The Transient Trust architecture uses hardware-based execution 
domains, or privilege levels (PLs) to separate the LPSK, TSL, TE 
and TPA.   
In traditional commodity processing environments, the 
applications and the operating system (OS) are separated into two 
execution domains.  For an Intel x86 CPU, the OS is located in 
privilege level 0 and the applications are in the least-privileged 
domain (privilege level 3).  However, commercial OSes today are 
large, complex and lack the structural modularity required to 
isolate and protect the security policy enforcement mechanism: all 
system services reside in a single hardware privilege level, where 
non-critical functions can affect critical policy enforcement 
mechanisms. 
Over thirty years ago, Anderson concluded that, for high 
assurance of security policy enforcement, the critical enforcement 
mechanisms must: enforce the policy at all times, protect 
themselves from unauthorized modification and be sufficiently 
small and simple to permit analysis of their correctness.[3]  
Subsequently, no plausible alternatives to this reference monitor 
approach have been proposed. Thus, today’s commercial OSes 
cannot provide a high degree of confidence in their correctness, or 
in the absence of malicious code. In contrast, the Transient Trust 
architecture fully utilizes the hardware privilege level mechanism 
to separate programs according to their relative privilege.  
6.4 Validation and Future Work 
A prototype of the architecture was developed as the basis for 
experimentation with different design approaches and for 
performance testing. The prototype runs on a four-privilege-level 
x86, and supports multiple partitions, keyboard and screen 
devices, a trusted path, and least privilege capabilities.  
The completed initial prototype demonstrates the effective use of 
the hardware protection mechanisms built into the Intel x86 
processor family [16]. The prototype was constructed using the 
Open Watcom Version 1.7 C compiler and linker [32] configured 
to generate 32-bit x86 code in the large memory model, and using 
the LX file format.[14]. The linker was modified to generate 
multi-segment data and executables per program (viz., the large 
memory model). The run-time kernel supports multiple hardware 
tasks; and all four hardware privilege levels, where the state of 
each privilege level within a task is maintained within the Task 
State Segment (TSS); hardware supported gates to permit calls to 
and returns from more privileged hardware domains within a task; 
and keyboard input and screen output associated with the 
execution of a selected partition. 
While the goal of the Transient Trust Architecture is to provide 
the user with access to common productivity applications, it is not 
the intent of this research to develop new techniques for (e.g., 
Type 1 [10] virtual machine monitoring. The TSL makes use of 
available hardware support, and para-virtualization [5] where 
necessary to support the TE and client OSes.  In the future, we 
expect to extend the design to take advantage of new 
virtualization techniques, e.g., for hosting more complex and 
heterogeneous OSes. For example, the LPSK and TSL could 
occupy “negative” privilege levels (e.g., PL0 and PL1 in Intel 
VMX root operation), while the client operating systems and their 
applications utilize the classical four hardware privilege levels.  
We are working on incorporating a framework into the Transient 
Trust architecture for objectively calibrating and interpreting the 
risks associated with exposing sensitive data to users with 
insufficient clearance.  This will provide a means for 
understanding which objects can be placed into an emergency 
partition.  We expect to experiment with different grades of 
emergency as well. 
7. RELATED WORK 
The US Government has recognized that, in emergencies, the 
need to access information may be more important than the need 
to protect the information, and has developed extensive technical 
and policy roadmaps to support that vision.[29][40] Our 
framework for management of emergency information advances 
the GIG vision by providing a theory and concrete realization to 
confine information made available under extraordinary 
circumstances and to rescind access after the completion of those 
circumstances.  
PACER [18] is the DHS National Center for Study of 
Preparedness and Catastrophic Event Response, lead by Johns 
Hopkins University. Pacer is conducting research into emergency 
preparedness and response, including enhanced situational 
awareness and critical decision-making, as well as the causes for 
the many past failures in emergency response, communication and 
data sharing. While it is within the scope of the PACER program 
to develop policy and legal analyses concerning constitutionality, 
autonomy, and privacy issues, our work differs in its emphasis on 
providing theory and technology to enable the secure sharing of 
information in an emergency.  
OASIS provides an EDXL standard [30] for information exchange 
during emergencies, such as confidentiality of payloads, and 
encryption of messages. The architecture presented here can 
provide a trusted context for the management of EDXL data.  
Few commercial PC-based OSes have used more than two Intel 
PLs, for reasons that may include: e.g., 1) potential performance 
penalties; 2) additional engineering costs; 3) lack of understanding 
of the security benefits; etc. There have been several secure 
architectures that have used multiple PLs on an Intel 
CPU.[36][35][24][25] These architectures, however, were built to 
provide only an application-execution environment.  The 
Transient Trust architecture provides both an application-
execution environment and, a virtual machine environment, where 
guest operating systems may also execute.  The architecture 
provides a device that will not only execute specialized 
applications in a trustworthy environment, but will also support 
commodity applications that users are familiar with, while still 
being constrained by a mandatory security policy. 
The Turaya [1][34] and MILS [2] [37] [39]architectures are 
designed to host commercial operating systems and security 
services as parallel application-domain entities, with certain 
interactions between those entities controlled by a microkernel 
(e.g., L4) and a separation kernel, respectively. The architecture 
presented here differs from these efforts (see also [22]) in that it 
does not rely on application domain programs for security policy 
enforcement, and it provides an interface for the enforcement of 
intra-OS least privilege policies as well as inter-OS sharing 
policies.  Additionally, the Tuyaya and MILS efforts do not 
address the temporal confinement, revocation, and distributed 
state-change issues inherent to emergency management of 
information. 
8. SUMMARY 
This paper describes the Transient Trust Architecture and related 
operational concepts for securely managing sensitive information 
during emergencies. Key software components of the architecture 
are the Least Privilege Separation Kernel (LPSK), a Trusted 
Security Services layer, a Trusted Executive and a Trusted path 
application.  The target platform for design and experimentation is 
a hand-held device, called the E-device. 
The key innovative properties of the Transient Trust Architecture 
are: a means of providing secure, transient access to sensitive 
information which can also completely revoke the information 
after the emergency; a dedicated environment for the use of high-
integrity applications such as for the trusted signing of documents; 
a means of directly utilizing the high assurance capabilities of the 
separation kernel to control communication and other interactions 
between partitions; and an efficient, flexible device model that 
allows direct access by guest operating systems to dedicated 
devices, and secure, kernel-mediated access to shared devices, the 
latter of which supports both serialized access per security level 
and concurrent multiplexing without the need for process-level 
context switching. 
The architecture provides a partitioned environment for separating 
information with different sensitivities. The strictly layered 
architecture supports commercial operating systems and 
applications in both normal and emergency contexts, so that 
emergency workers can be familiar with the E-device through 
frequent use, and the device might be readily available for 
emergencies.   The LPSK is the nexus of security policy 
enforcement, and is designed to meet both the basic and the least 
privilege requirements of the NSA’s Protection Profile for 
Separation Kernels in Environments Requiring High Robustness.  
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